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The Scales Tip In Favor of Parents in Winkelman v.
Parma City School District
By Nidya Aldana Paredes*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA") was
enacted to provide children with disabilities with a free appropriate
public education.' One of the stated purposes of the IDEA is "to
ensure that the rights of children with disabilities and parents of such
children are protected.",2 In enacting the IDEA 3 Congress considered
approximately thirty years of research which proved that children
with disabilities tend to learn better when the role and responsibility
of parents is strengthened.4 In light of this research, Congress
mandated procedural safeguards within the IDEA that would ensure
* J.D. Candidate, May 2009, Pepperdine University School of Law; B.A.
Religion and Intercultural Communication, 2006, Pepperdine University. Thanks
to Professor Peterson for introducing me to special education law and Elizabeth
Allen for her support and advice. Thanks to God for this great opportunity and my
husband and family for their love and constant encouragement.
1. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A) (2004).
2. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(B).
3. 20 U.S.C § 1400(2)(1)(A). Originally the IDEA was the Education for All
Handicapped Children Act of 1975 ("EHA") but in 2004 was changed to the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act of 2004. While the names and
methodology are different, their purpose remains the same: to provide children with
disabilities with a free appropriate public education. 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (d)(1)(A).
4. 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (c)(5)(B) states that 30 years of research have shown that
"strengthening the role and responsibility of parents and ensuring that families of
such children have meaningful opportunities to participate in the education of their
children at school and at home" has a positive effect on the education of children
with disabilities.
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that parents have an opportunity to participate and to be heard in the
creation and implementation of their child's educational plan.5
Congress recognized that school districts alone could not guarantee
that children with disabilities would receive an effective education. 6
By vesting certain powers and rights in parents, Congress' goal was
to balance the scales in the sometimes adversarial relationship
between parents and school districts.
In recent years, however, the Supreme Court has tipped the scale
heavily in favor of school districts. In 2005, Shaffer v. Weast shifted
the burden of proof in administrative hearings to parents.7 One year
later, a second case was decided by the Supreme Court which also
lent support to the school districts: Arlington Central School District
v. Murphy.8 The Court in Arlington held that parents who prevail in
court would no longer be able to recover expert fees as part of their
litigation costs.9  This decision made it even more difficult for
parents who could not afford to pay for experts out of pocket to carry
their burden of proof in court."° However, on May 21, 2007, with the
Court's decision in Winkelman v. Parma City School District, the
scales are finally rebalancing by tipping in favor of parents.11
Winkelman is a significant victory for parents as it allows them to
represent their children's interests in court without the assistance of
counsel.' 2 Not only does this decision allow parents who could not
afford legal assistance to defend their children's rights, but in a much
broader sense, the decision affirms parental rights under the IDEA. 3
This case note presents a thorough examination of the Supreme
Court's recent opinion in Winkelman and its effect on parents and
school districts involved in special education law. Part II relates the
historical background of special education law with an emphasis on
the role of parents. In Part III the facts of the Winkelman decision are
5. Procedural safeguards are addressed in the IDEA § 1415 et seq. They are
discussed in depth in Part II of this case note.
6. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(5)(B).
7. Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49 (2005).
8. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Ed. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291 (2006).
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 127 S. Ct. 1994 (2007).
12. Id.
13. Id.
summarized. Part IV sets forth an analytical critique of the Supreme
Court majority and dissenting opinions. Then Part V of the article
contains the impact of the Winkelman decision on special education
law in general and on parents and school districts. Part VI concludes
the article.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The IDEA was enacted to serve two main purposes: "to ensure
that all children with disabilities have available to them a free
appropriate public education that emphasizes special education and
related services to meet their unique needs..." and "to ensure that the
rights of children with disabilities and parents of such children are
protected... 14
A child's legal right to a basic education was first established by
the Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of Education. 15 In Brown the
Supreme Court held that racial segregation of African American
children from public schools was unjust and detrimental to both
Caucasian and African American children.1 6 Special education rights
advocates relied on the language in Brown v. Board in arguing that
separation based on physical or mental disability was also
detrimental and unjust.17  The language of Brown was seen as
applying to children with disabilities who were not receiving
appropriate educational services to which they were entitled. 8
Statements like the following were applied to special education
14. 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (d)(1)(A)-(B).
15. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Special Education case law
and advocates frequently draw on the language in Brown making a connection
between racial segregation and the segregation in special education placements.
16. Brown, 347 U.S. at 483.
17. PETER WRIGHT & PAMELA WRIGHT, SPECIAL EDUCATION LAW 13 (2d. ed.
2007).
18. 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (c)(2)(A). (explaining in further detail the reasons why
children with disabilities were not having their educational needs met : "(A) the
children did not receive appropriate educational services; (B) the children were
excluded entirely from the public school system and from being educated with their
peers; (C) undiagnosed disabilities prevented the children from having a successful
educational experience; or (D) a lack of adequate resources within the public
school system forced families to find services outside the public school system").
20 U.S.C. § 1400 (c) (2) (A)-(D).
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advocacy and references to race were replaced with references to
disabilities:
Segregation of white and colored children in public
schools has a detrimental effect upon the colored
children. The impact is greater when it has the
sanction of the law; for the policy of separating the
races is usually interpreted as denoting the inferiority
of the Negro group. A sense of inferiority affects the
motivation of a child to learn. Segregation with the
sanction of law, therefore, has a tendency to [retard]
the educational and mental development of Negro
children and to deprive them of some of the benefits
they would receive in a racially integrated school
system. 19
A. Early Case Law Establishing Parental Involvement
Before the enactment of the Education for All Handicapped
Children Act of 1975, one special education case paved the way for
change: PARC v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.20  PARC dealt
particularly with parental involvement in a child's educational
placement. In PARC the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania held certain state statutes permitting school
districts to bar the enrollment of children who were mentally retarded
were unconstitutional. A consent decree was agreed to by the state
and the parents forming the class action whereby the state would
provide children with mental retardation with the same free public
education guaranteed to the rest of its children. Equally significant,
however, was the stipulation between the parties which provided that
before a child with mental retardation could be assigned or re-
assigned to regular or special educational status, or excluded
altogether from public education, a prior recorded hearing before a
special hearing officer must be held.2 ' At this hearing a parent would
have the right "to representation by counsel, to examine their child's
19. Brown, 347 U.S. at 494.
20. Pa. Assn. for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D.
Pa, 1971); 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
21. PARC, 343 F. Supp. at 284-85.
records, to compel the attendance of school officials who may have
relevant evidence to offer, to cross-examine witnesses testifying on
behalf of school officials and to introduce evidence of their own." 22
Though PARC did not set precedent it did influence the
Congressional Investigation of 1972 where findings revealed the
extreme numbers of children with disabilities who were not receiving
appropriate educations and urged changes be made to special
education law.23 It was recognized that failure to provide individuals
with disabilities with appropriate education would not only be a
burden on the individuals themselves but on society as a whole,
"taxpayers will spend billions of dollars over the lifetimes of these
individuals to maintain such persons as dependents and in a
minimally acceptable lifestyle." 24 If an appropriate education were to
be provided, however, children with disabilities might be prepared to
become more independent individuals who could contribute to
society.25 This investigation and its findings prompted Congress to
enact Public Law 93-142, also known as the Education for All
Handicapped Children Act of 1975 ("Act of 1975").
The Act of 1975 ensured that children with disabilities had a right
to an education and-through the establishment of procedural
safeguards-that school districts were held accountable for providing
such. Protection of parental rights was mentioned as another reason
for the necessity of the legal checks and balances of procedural
safeguards.26 The most recent amendment made to the Act of 1975
was on December 3, 2004 and created the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA").
22. PARC at 285. See Also, WRIGHT & WRIGHT, supra note 17, at 13 which
says "In the subsequent settlement, it was agreed that educational placement
decisions must include a process of parental participation and a means to resolve
disputes."
23. WRIGHT & WRIGHT, supra note 17, at 14. Out of approximately 8 million
children with disabilities, only 3.9 were receiving an appropriate education, 1.75
million received no educational services at all, and 2.5 million were receiving an
inappropriate education. Id. (citing to United States Code Congressional and
Administrative News 1975 at 1430).
24. WRIGHT & WRIGHT, supra note 17, at 14 (citing to U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1433).
25. Id.
26. WRIGHT & WRIGHT, supra note 17, at 14.
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B. The Individuals With Disabilities Education Act
The most significant section of the IDEA is Section 1400 which
relays the findings and purposes of the Act. The findings27 that led to
the amendments of the IDEA explain that the fundamental objectives
of the Act have over time been hindered by "low expectations, and an
insufficient focus on applying replicable research on proven methods
of teaching and learning for children with disabilities. ' 28  The
findings go on to state that "almost 30 years of research and
experience" have shown that children with disabilities will learn
more effectively when their instructors have "high expectations" and
when parental involvement is strengthened.29 Building on these
findings, Congress stated the purposes of the IDEA as being, "to
ensure that all children with disabilities have available to them a free
appropriate public education that emphasizes special education and
related services designed to meet their unique needs and prepare
them for further education, employment and independent living" and
"to ensure that the rights of children with disabilities and parents of
such children are protected. '30 The remaining sections of the IDEA
provide detailed application of the law all the while promoting the
purposes intended by Congress.
Under the IDEA special education is defined as "specially
designed instruction, at no cost to parents, to meet the unique needs
of a child with a disability, including-(A) instruction conducted in
the classroom, in the home, in hospitals and institutions, and in other
settings; and (B) instruction in physical education."31 This "specially
designed instruction"32 is delivered to a child with disabilities in the
form of a "Free Appropriate Public Education" ("FAPE"). FAPE is
defined as special education and related services at public expense,
meeting state educational standards, including appropriate placement
at a public school, and provided in conformity with the
27. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c).
28. 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (c)(4).
29. 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (c)(5).
30. 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (d)(1).
31. 20 U.S.C. § 1401 (29).
32. Id.
individualized education program ("IEP"). " The IEP is the heart of
special education and is the curriculum or the substance of the child's
education. " It is "a written statement for each child with a disability
that is developed, reviewed, and revised" by teachers, school faculty
including therapists and principals, and parents. 35
C. Parental Participation as Required by the IDEA
The Congressional Findings of the IDEA place the role of
parental involvement in high regard:
Almost 30 years of research and experience has
demonstrated that the education of children with
disabilities can be made more effective
by... (B)strengthening the role and responsibility of
parents and ensuring that families of such children
33. 20 U.S.C. § 1401 (9) defines a "Free Appropriate Public Education"
(FAPE) as,
[S]pecial education and related services that - (A) have been
provided at public expense, under public supervision and
direction, and without charge; (B) meet the standards of the State
educational agency; (C) include an appropriate preschool,
elementary school, or secondary school education in the State
involved; and (D) are provided in conformity with the
individualized education program required under Section 1414
(d) of this title.
20 U.S.C. § 1401 (9).
34. 20 U.S.C. § 1401 (14).
35 Id. The written statement that is the "IEP" includes among other factors -
(I) A statement of the child's present levels of academic
achievement and functional performance... (II) a statement of
measurable annual goal, including academic and functional
goals... (III) a description of how the child's progress toward
meeting the annual goals described in sub-clause (II) will be
measured and when periodic reports ... will be provided... (IV) a
statement of the special education related services and
supplementary aids and services ...that will be provided for the
child..." and "(VII) the projected date for the beginning of the
services...and the anticipated frequency, location, and duration
of those services and modifications...
20 U.S.C. § 1414 (d)(1)(A)(i).
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having meaningful opportunities to participate in the
education of their children at school and at home. 36
One of the IDEA's main purposes is to "ensure that the rights of
children with disabilities and parents of such children are
protected. 37  States are required to "establish and maintain
procedures... to ensure that children with disabilities and their parents
are guaranteed procedural safeguards with respect to the provision of
a free appropriate public education." 38 Both federal and state law
currently give parents of children with disabilities rights with regards
to the foundational decisions related to their child's education. 39
Parental involvement rights and responsibilities can be categorized as
they pertain to one of the following three areas: 1) Assessments and
Evaluations; 2) The IEP Process; and 3) Procedural Safeguards.4 °
1. Assessments and Evaluations
An initial evaluation of whether a child can or should be placed in
special education begins after a written referral from a teacher or
other education professional or by written request from a parent. 41
However, before the actual evaluation may begin a parent must
approve the district's proposed assessments and evaluations by
36. 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (c)(5)(A)-(C) (emphasis added).
37. 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (d)(1)(B) (emphasis added). Parent in the IDEA means
"(A) a natural adoptive, or foster parent of a child... (B) a guardian.. .(C)an
individual acting in the place of a natural or adoptive parent with whom the child
lives, or an individual who is legally responsible for the child's welfare." 20 U.S.C.
§ 1401(23).
38. 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (a).
39. COMMUNITY ALLIANCE FOR SPECIAL EDUCATION & PROTECTION AND
ADvOCACY, INC., SPECIAL EDUCATION RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES 1-14, Q. 13
(9th ed. 2005) (explaining that along with the rights, a parent also has the
"responsibility to be knowledgeable and concerned about the child's educational
needs and to participate in the procedures set forth in the laws").
40. Richard Peterson, Professor at Pepperdine University School of Law,
Special Education Law Lecture (August 23, 2007) (lecture slides in possession of
Professor Richard Peterson and author).
41. 20 U.S.C. § 1414 (a)(1)(B).
written consent.42 After the evaluations and assessments have been
conducted a copy of such must be provided to the parents at no
cost.43 Parental consent is required before the services determined by
the evaluations and assessments can be delivered to the child; this
consent must be separate from the initial evaluation consent
mentioned before.' Prior to conducting any re-evaluation of a child
with disabilities written consent is required from the parent.45
2. The IEP Process
Once evaluations and assessments have been administered, the
Individualized Education Program ("IEP") is developed.46 Parents
are regarded as important members of the IEP team and have the
right to receive written notice of the time, location, and purpose of
the IEP.47 This notice must be given "early enough to ensure that
[the parent(s)] will have an opportunity to attend; and...[must be
held] at a mutually agreed on time and place. 48 The parent has the
right to invite any other individual at their discretion to the IEP
meeting.49 The Local Education Agency (the school district in most
cases) "must take whatever action is necessary to ensure that the
parent understands the proceedings of the IEP Team meeting,
including arranging for an interpreter for parents with deafness or
whose native language is other than English., 50 If the public agency
has developed a draft proposal of an IEP then it must be provided to
42. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(1)(B). See also 20 U.S.C. §1414 (a)(1)(D)(i)
(requiring that prior to an initial evaluation, the agency proposing the evaluation
obtain informed consent from the parent).
43. 20 U.S.C. §1414 (b)(4)(B) ("a copy of the evaluation report and the
documentation of determination of eligibility shall be given to the parent"). See 34
C.F.R. § 300.306(a)(2) (2004) (evaluation reports should be provided at no cost to
the parent).
44. 20 U.S.C. § 1414 (a)(l)(D)(ii).
45. 20 U.S.C. § 1414 (c)(3).
46. 20 U.S.C. § 1414 (d).
47. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.322(b)(1)(i).
48. 34 C.F.R. § 300.322(a)(1)-(2).
49. See 20 U.S.C. § 1414 (d)(1)(B). Parents can invite other individuals whom
they feel have "knowledge or special expertise regarding the child, including
related services personnel as appropriate." Id.
50. 34 C.F.R. § 300.322.
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the parent before the IEP meeting so that the parent can review it and
thereby be able to fully participate in the JEP meeting. 51 The public
agency is not permitted to have the final IEP completed before the
JEP team meeting is held. 52 The attendance of an IEP team member
can only be excused or waived after a parent gives informed consent
in writing.53 Without this written consent of the parent the LEP
meeting must be postponed.54 Once convened, the JEP team must
give due deference to the concerns of the parents regarding the
education of their child.55 Among other aspects of the JEP statement,
the team must include a statement describing the method by which
the student's parents will be made aware of the student's progress
toward realizing the annual goals.56 Finally, a parent also has the
right to obtain a copy of the IEP57, have the JEP reviewed annually
58
and have the JEP implemented as soon as possible.59
51. See WRIGHT & WRIGHT, supra note 17, at 99, fn. 73 (stating that "it is not
permissible for an agency to have the final IEP completed before an IEP Team
meeting begins").
52. See id.
53. 20 U.S.C. § 1414 (d)(l)(C)(i)-(iii). IEP team members include:
(i) the parents of the child with a disability; (ii) not less than 1
regular education teacher of such child (if the child is, or may be,
participating in the regular education environment);(iii) not less
than 1 special education teacher; (iv)a representative of the local
education agency; (v) an individual who can interpret the
instructional implications . of evaluation results; (vi) at the
discretion of the parent or agency, other individuals who have
knowledge or special expertise regarding the child; and whenever
appropriate, (vii) the child with the disability. 20 U.S.C. §1414(d)(1)(B)(i)-(vii).
54. See 20 U.S.C. § 1414 (d)(1)(B) & (C).
55. 20 U.S.C. § 1414 (d)(3).
56. 20 U.S.C. § 1414 (d)(1)(A)(i)(II)(requiring "a description of how the
child's progress toward meeting the annual goals described in subclause (II) will be
measured and when periodic reports on the progress the child is making toward
meeting the annual goals.. .will be provided")
57. 34 C.F.R. § 300.322(e).
58. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(4)(A); 34 C.F.R. 300.324(b).
59. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.323(a) & (c)(2)
3. Procedural Safeguards
An entire section of the Act is devoted to procedural safeguards
to ensure that the rights of the parents are in fact protected.6 °
Procedural safeguards established by the IDEA require, for example,
that a parent's concerns regarding his or her child's lack of or slow
progress be addressed.61 Parents are allotted an opportunity to
review all records pertinent to their child and to attend and participate
in all meetings regarding identification, evaluation, and educational
placement of their child.62 A parent has the right to request an
Independent Educational Evaluation ("IEE"), per the IDEA, if she
disagrees with the school's assessments and evaluations of her
child.63 An IEE allows a parent who disagrees with the school
district's evaluation of his child to hire an independent qualified
examiner, not employed by the school, to evaluate the child.64 Once
a parent makes a request for an IEE the school district can agree to
provide one at public expense 65 or they can file a due process
complaint to request a hearing to show the appropriateness of the
evaluation. 66 Yet another procedural safeguard built into the IDEA is
the requirement of "written prior notice" to be given to the parents
before the school initiates, refuses or makes any changes to a child's
services.67 Other procedural safeguards include the opportunity for
alternative dispute resolution through mediation,68  and the
60. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415.
61. See WRIGHT & WRIGHT, supra note 17, at 103, fn. 98.
62. 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (b)(1).
63. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1).
64. See also 34 C.F.R. § 300.502.
65. Public expense means that the school district or public agency pays for the
evaluation making sure it is at no cost to the parent. 34 C.F.R. 300.502 § 300.103.
66. 34 C.F.R. § 300.502(b)(2)(i)-(ii).
67. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(3).
68. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(5). See also § 1415(e) requiring that the mediation
process is
(i) voluntary on the part of the parties; (ii) is not used to deny or
delay a parent's right to a due process hearing.., or to deny any
other rights afforded under this part; and (iii) is conducted by a
qualified and impartial mediator who is trained in effective
mediation techniques.
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opportunity to present a complaint regarding any matter related to the
identification, evaluation or placement of a child, or the provision of
FAPE to that child.69
D. Case Law History Implied in Winkelman v. Parma
City School District
1. Supreme Court Case Law
Though the IDEA provided many provisions to protect the rights
of parents and children, following its enactment, school districts
fought hard for an interpretation of the Act in their favor. School
districts were successful in Schaffer v. Weast,7 a significant case for
parents because it placed the burden of persuasion in administrative
hearings regarding the appropriateness of their child's IEP on them.7'
The school district offered placement at one of two middle schools to
the Schaffer's son, Brian, who suffered from learning disabilities and
speech-language impairments.72 The Schaffers disagreed with the
placement, so they enrolled Brian in a private school, then filed for a
due process hearing to challenge the IEP and receive reimbursement
for Brian's private school tuition.73 The issue at the administrative
hearing, and on subsequent appeals, centered around whether the
burden of persuasion should lay on the parents or the district.74 The
Supreme Court granted certiorari and held that the burden lays on the
The State bears the cost of the mediation and not the parents. 20 U.S.C. §
1415 (e)(2)(D).
69. 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (b)(6)(A)-(B). The statute of limitations is two years.
Id.
70. Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49 (2005).
71. Id. at 51.
72. Id. at 54.
73. Id. at 55.
74. Id. The Shaffers appealed this decision to the United States District Court
for the District of Maryland where it was reversed and the burden placed on the
school district. Id. Before the appeal was decided in the appellate court, the
administrative law judge reconsidered the case and reversed his opinion in favor of
the parents, placing the burden on the school district. Id. The district court
reaffirmed its ruling that the school had the burden and on appeal, a divided panel
of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed. Id. The
Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the question. Id. at 55-56.
g 28 T a
party seeking relief, in most cases the parent.75 The Court noted that
while the IDEA remains silent on this issue, the ordinary default rule
is that plaintiffs bear the burden of proving their claims.76 The Court
also considered the expense of administrative hearings on schools 77
and the IDEA's heavy reliance upon the school districts to meet its
goals. 7
8
No less than one year after Schaffer made parents think twice
before filing a due process complaint, another case made its way to
the Supreme Court that would also hit parents hard: Arlington
Central School District v. Murphy.79 Arlington addressed whether
parents who prevail in court can recover fees for services rendered by
experts.80 After prevailing in the district court and Second Circuit,
the Murphys, parents of Joseph Murphy, sought $29,350 in fees for
the expert services of Marilyn Arons, an educational consultant who
assisted them in the IDEA administrative proceedings. 81 The district
and appellate courts held that while the Murphys were entitled to
some reimbursement, it was significantly less than what they were
asking for.82 The Supreme Court granted certiorari and held that
reimbursement of expert's fees is not appropriate under the IDEA.83
The Court noted that the condition of reimbursement of expert's fees
is nowhere to be found in the IDEA 84, and that the IDEA was passed
pursuant to the Spending Clause, which requires clear and
"unambiguous" notice of any imposed conditions to the states before
the federal government can enforce them.85 Since the condition of
75. See id. at 62.
76. See id. at 56.
77. The cost is approximately $8,000 to $12,000 per hearing. Id. at 59.
78. See id.
79. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 126 S. Ct. 2455
(2006).
80. See id. at 2457.
81. See id. at 2457-58.
82. See id.
83. See id. at 2463-64.
84. The Court pointed out that the governing provision of the IDEA provides
that "[i]n any action or proceeding brought under this section, the court, in its
discretion, may award reasonable attorney's fees as part of the costs" to parents.
Id. at 2459. There is no mention of "expert's fees." Id.
85. Id. at 2459.
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reimbursement for expert's fees appears nowhere in the IDEA, it
cannot be imposed.
The last two Supreme Court special education cases were far
from favorable to parents, only making it harder for them to protect
their children's and their own rights. However, another issue had
been brewing in the lower courts that eventually found its way to the
Supreme Court. Much to everyone's surprise, the issue tipped the
scales in favor of parents. This case was Winkelman, which brought
to bear the issue of whether a parent can represent their children's
interest in court without the assistance of legal counsel. The question
had been addressed by district courts and appellate courts alike, but
the answer varied across the board.
2. Case Law in the Lower Courts
Federal statute 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (2006) states that "[i]n all courts
of the United States the parties may plead and conduct their own
cases personally or by counsel as, by the rules of such courts,
respectively, are permitted to manage and conduct causes therein." 86
This statute leaves no question as to the fact that the assistance of
counsel is not required for parties who represent their own interests
in federal court.87 The question thus becomes whether parents in
special education cases are parties for purposes of this statute: does
the IDEA grant parents "interests" or rights?
In 1998, Doe v. Board of Education addressed the question
whether a prevailing parent who is also an attorney is entitled to
receive attorney's fees for the work performed on behalf of his
child.88 The court held that such a parent is not entitled to attorney's
fees.89 While this issue is not the same as the one in Winkelman,
school districts have used some of the court's language in Doe to
support their argument that the IDEA does not give parents a real
party interest in any proceeding. 90 Doe stands for the proposal that
"[t]hough parents have some rights under the IDEA, the child, not the
86. 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (2006).
87. See Winkelman, 127 S. Ct. at 1999.
88. See Doe v. Bd. of Educ. of Baltimore County, 165 F.3d 260 (4th Cir.
1998).
89. See Doe, 165 F.3d at 265.
90. See Winkelman, 127 S. Ct. at 2003.
parents, is the real party in interest in any IDEA proceeding. The
references to parents are best understood as accommodations to the
fact of the child's incapacity." 91
The same year, another case made it to the Third Circuit,
Collinsgru v. Palmyra92 , addressing the very same issue later to be
decided by Winkelman. The Collinsgrus appealed the decision of a
state administrative agency denying their son special education
services, and proceeded to represent his rights at the district court
level.93 The district court gave the Collinsgrus thirty days to hire an
attorney since they could not represent their child in court and when
they failed to do so, dismissed their claim with prejudice. 94  On
appeal of their dismissal, the Collinsgrus argued that "(1) the IDEA
creates the same rights in parents that it creates in children; (2) the
claims in their son's complaint are functionally their own; and (3)
they should therefore be allowed to proceed pro se on those
claims." 95 The court of appeals reasoned that neither the IDEA's
language nor legislative history suggest that Congress did not intend
to create joint rights in parents under the IDEA, and therefore
affirmed the district court's dismissal.96 The Court noted that the
language in the IDEA is "unclear on its face," at times seeming to
intend that parents and children each have substantive rights, and yet
at other times suggesting the opposite.97 Due to the ambiguity in
both the IDEA and legislative history and precedent case law
suggesting no such right exists in parents, the Court ruled that parents
could proceed pro se for procedural violations98 but not for
substantive claims.99
Finally in 2003, the First Circuit reached a decision that would
give parents the right to sue pro se in all respects with Maroni v.
91. Doe, 165 F.3d at 263.
92. Collinsgru v. Palmyra Bd. of Educ., 161 F.3d 225 (3rd Cir. 1998).
93. See Collinsgru, 161 F.3d at 227.
94. Id. The district court was bound by a Third Circuit decision, Osei-Afriyie
v. Med. College of Pa., where the court held that a non-attorney parent could not
represent his children in a tort action in federal court. Collinsgru, 161 F.3d at 227.
95. Collinsgru, 161 F.3d at 227.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 235.
98. Id. at 233.
99. Id. at 235-36.
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Pemi-Baker Regional School District.0 Dissatisfied with their son
Michael's proposed IEP and the procedures employed to develop it,
the Maronis, without the assistance of counsel, proceeded to file suit
in federal court.1" 1  The district court dismissed the suit on the
grounds that the Maronis had no individual claim under the IDEA.
10 2
Following the dismissal, Michael's father filed a motion to reconsider
in which he included an affidavit stating that while he and his family
did not meet the financial need criteria for court-appointed legal
assistance, they also were unable to find a lawyer who would take the
case on pro-bono or for an affordable fee.' 0 3 After the district court
dismissed once more, the Maronis filed an appeal with the First
Circuit, claiming their right to proceed pro se on two grounds: 1) the
IDEA grants "parties aggrieved" the right to bring suit in federal
court, and they are "parties aggrieved" and in the alternative, 2) an
exception should be created to exempt IDEA cases from the common
law rule that prevents parents from proceeding pro se.104 The court
considered the decisions of other circuits, including the decision in
Collinsgru and prior court practice under the Education for All
Handicapped Children Act of 1975 in which parents were allowed to
sue pro se.105  In determining whether the parents are "parties
aggrieved" under 28 U.S.C. § 2344,106 the court turned to Article III
of the Constitution which defines an aggrieved party as one who can
show injury-in-fact, causation, and redressability.10 7  The court
reasoned that parents suffer the injury-in-fact when their child is
denied FAPE by the school district.' Also, the court noted that a
distinction is never made between the right of parents to seek relief
for substantive or procedural issues. 0 9 For these reasons, the court
100. Maroni v. Pemi-Baker Reg'l Sch. Dist., 346 F.3d 247 (1st Cir. 2003).
101. Id. at 248.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 249.
105. According to the Maroni Court, under the EHA courts almost uniformly
allowed parents to sue pro se. Id. at 250.
106. 28 U.S.C. § 2344 is a statute that permits "parties aggrieved" to seek
judicial review of final orders by specified agencies. Maroni, 346 F.3d at 253.
107. Maroni, 346 F.3d at 253-54.
108. Id. at 254.
109. Id.
held that parents were "parties aggrieved" and so were permitted to
sue pro se in regards to both procedural and substantive issues.1 1
0
Maroni also addressed some of the drawbacks of not allowing
parents to sue on behalf of their children."1  Many children with
special needs would be robbed of their day in court if a rule
prohibiting pro se representation were enacted."l 2 The difficulty in
obtaining pro-bono representation and the under-resourced nature of
many legal aid organizations1' 3 makes parental representation almost
necessary. 114 One consequence of permitting parents to sue pro se,
that the school district in Maroni as well as in Winkelman most
heavily argued was that children would not receive the best
representation from their untrained parents. 1 5  But, the court
responds, that the possibility of having a less than skilled parent
representing a child is better than no advocate at all. 1 6 The court
concluded that this risk and others can be dealt with as they arise
because the benefit of some representation far outweighs the risks of
no representation at all." 7
Quite the opposite conclusion was reached in Cavanaugh v.
Cardinal Local School District decided by the Sixth Circuit in
2005.118 The Cavanaughs, who were not lawyers, appealed from the
decision of a magistrate judge's order denying their claim that the
Cardinal Local School District failed to provide their son with
110. Id. at 250.
111. Id. at 257.
112. Id.
113. The Disability Rights Center ("DRC") and National Association of
Protection and Advocacy Systems ("NAPAS") submitted an amicus brief in which
they recounted the scarcity of representation available. Id. at 258, fn. 9. In 2002,
the DRC was able to represent 35 out of 390 special education inquiries; other
similar agencies report these strikingly low ratios as well. Id. The amicus brief
also revealed that for parents who do not meet the financial need criteria to receive
assistance from these legal aid organizations, the shortage of private representation
is also a barrier. Id. In Michigan, the Protection and Advocacy Agency lists eight
private attorneys on its referral list; Rhode Island has six; Texas has twenty-nine
and Arizona only one. Id.
114. Maroni, 346 F.3d at 257.
115. Id. at 258.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Cavanaugh v. Cardinal Local Sch. Dist., 409 F.3d 753 (6th Cir. 2005).
Spring 2008 The Scales Tip
294 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary 28-1
FAPE. 119  The school district filed a motion to dismiss on the
grounds that the Cavanaughs, in asserting their son's right, had no
right to proceed pro se.121 In rebutting that claim, the Cavanaughs
argued that their appeal was appropriate because: "1) they may
represent Kyle's rights under the IDEA and 2) the IDEA grants them
a cognizable right of their own to a FAPE for their son."' 121 In its
analysis the court turned to an interpretive guideline established by
the Supreme Court:
[S]tatutes which invade the common law... are to
be read with a presumption favoring the retention of
long-established and familiar principles, except when
a statutory purpose to the contrary is evident ... [i]n
order to abrogate a common-law principle, the statute
must 'speak directly' to the question addressed by the
common law.' 22
The court then laid down a common-law rule stating that a non-
lawyer is not permitted to represent another person in court. It also
and pointed out that there is no language in the IDEA that overrides
this common-law rule. 123 Rather, the court went on to say, Congress
made a significant distinction in the IDEA between the rights of a
parent in an administrative hearing and their rights once in federal
court. 124  Congress explicitly granted parents the right to present
evidence and to examine witnesses on behalf of their children during
an administrative hearing, but, in stark contrast, failed to mention any
such parental rights when it granted "any aggrieved party access to
federal courts."' 25 Consequently, the court held that the IDEA does
119. Id. at 755.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 756. (citing United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529, 534 (1993)).
123. Cavanaugh, 409 F.3d at 756. (citing to Heldt v. Nicholson, No. 99-2120,
200 WL 1176879 at *1 (6th Cir. Aug. 10, 2000)).
124. Cavanaugh, 409 F.3d. at 756.
125. Id. (citing to 20 U.S.C. §1415 (f)(1)). Here the court used the
interpretive rule of canon "expression unius est exclusion alterius" which means
that the mentioning of one thing excludes another. Cavanaugh, 409 F.3d at 756.
Here, since Congress did listed the rights a parent has during an administrative
not grant non-lawyer parents the right to represent their child.'26
Furthermore, the court observed that while the IDEA does grant
parents limited procedural rights, 127 the right to FAPE belongs to the
child and not the parents.128
With the Courts of Appeal split on the question of pro se
representation, it was no wonder that the Supreme Court chose to
resolve the issue once and for all with Winkelman.
III. FACTS
A. Substantive Facts
Jeff and Sandee Winkelman ("the "Winkelmans") are the
parents of Jacob Winkelman, a child diagnosed with autism spectrum
disorder.' 29 At the age of six, Jacob was enrolled at Pleasant Valley
Elementary School, a school of the Parma City School District in
Parma, Ohio.' 30 Seeking review of Jacob's progress at school, the
Winkelmans collaborated with the school district to develop an
Individualized Education Program ("IEP") for the 2003-2004 school
year.' 3' The school district's proposed IEP placed Jacob at a public
elementary school. 132  The Winkelmans regarded this proposal as
deficient.' 3 3 Parma City School District is a participant in the federal
funding program provided for by the IDEA. 134 In order to receive
monetary assistance, the school district must comply with the IDEA's
hearing, but did not list any such parental rights when discussing federal court
proceedings, the logical conclusion using this interpretative tool, would be that
Congress did not intend for parents to have any rights of representation in federal
court. Id.
126. Cavanaugh, 409 F.3d at 756.
127. Examples of these limited rights include the right to participate in and
attend IEPs, receive prior written notice of any proposed changes to the IEP, and to
take part in IEP hearings. Id. at 757.
128. Id.
129. Winkelman, 127 S. Ct. at 1998.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
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requisites, which include providing every child who has a disability
with a "free appropriate public education."'' 35
Availing their rights as provided by the IDEA, the Winkelmans
sought administrative review. 13 6 In their complaint they alleged that
the school district failed to provide Jacob with a free appropriate
public education. 3 7 After the hearing officer rejected their claim, the
Winkelmans appealed to a state-level review officer only to be
rejected once more. 138
Still concerned that their child was not receiving an appropriate
education and aware that the process was becoming ever lengthy, the
Winkelmans proceeded to remove Jacob from his current public
school and placed him in a private school. 139 They paid the tuition
out of their own pocket. 40 They then filed a complaint in the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio on their own
behalf and on behalf of Jacob. 141 The complaint challenged the
administrative decision making the following allegations: (1) Jacob
had not been provided a free appropriate public education; (2) his
IEP was inadequate; and (3) the school district did not follow
procedures as laid out by the IDEA. 142 In the complaint they sought
reversal of the administrative decision, reimbursement for the
private-school expenditures, declaratory relief, and attorney's fees
already incurred. 143 Because they were not themselves attorneys, the
Winkelmans hired an attorney to help them with certain aspects of
the proceedings, although they filed the complaint on their own. 144
135. Id. A "free appropriate public education" must be in accordance with the
IEP that is created by a joint collaboration between school faculty and officials
together with the parents of the child. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 1999.
144. Id. at 1998.
The Scales Tip
B. Decision Below
1. The District Court's Decision
Upon filing of the complaint, the school district made a motion
for judgment on the pleadings.145 The District Court granted
respondent school district's motion finding it did had in fact provided
Jacob with a free appropriate public education. 4 6 Proceeding without
counsel, the Winkelmans filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals.
2. The Decision of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
Basing their decision on Cavanaugh, the Court of Appeals
entered an order to dismiss the appeal unless the Winkelmans
obtained counsel to represent Jacob. 147 The court reasoned that non-
lawyer parents are not able to litigate IDEA claims on behalf of their
child because "the IDEA does not abrogate the common-law rule
prohibiting non-lawyer parents from representing their minor
children.' ' 148 This decision, like the one in Cavanaugh, brought the
Sixth Circuit in direct conflict with the First Circuit. 149 The First
Circuit had concluded in Maroni, "0 under a theory of "statutory joint
rights," that the IDEA does in fact give parents the right to assert
IDEA claims on their own behalf.15 1  Due to the disagreement
between the Circuits the Supreme Court granted certiorari in 2006.152
Arguments were presented by each side on February 27, 2007 and a
decision was made on May 21, 2007. A 7-2 decision reversed the
lower courts' decisions and held in favor of the Winkelmans, stating
145. Id. at 1999.
146. Id.
147. Id. In Cavanaugh the Court of Appeals decided that per the IDEA non-
lawyer parents raising IDEA claims in federal court cannot proceed pro se. Id.
(See Section supra Section II for further summary of Cavanaugh).
148. Winkelman, 127 S. Ct. at 1999. See also, 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (allowing
parties to prosecute their own claims pro se).
149. Winkelman, 127 S. Ct. at 1999.
150. Maroni v. Pemi-Baker Reg'l Sch. Dist., 346 F. 3d 247, 249 (CAlst.
Cir.. 1. 2003).
151. Winkelman, 127 S. Ct. at 1999.
152. Id.
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that the "IDEA grants parents independent, enforceable rights"
thereby entitling them to prosecute IDEA claims on their own
behalf.153
IV. ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE OF OPINION
The majority opinion, authored by Justice Kennedy, was joined
by Justice Roberts, Justice Stevens, Justice Souter, Justice Ginsburg,
Justice Breyer, and Justice Alito. 154  Justice Scalia concurred in
judgment in part and dissented in part, he was joined by Justice
Thomas. 155
A. Justice Kennedy 's Majority Opinion
Justice Kennedy begins his opinion by giving a cursory recount
of the facts of the case and stating the main question at the center of
the dispute: whether the IDEA provides the parent of a child with
disabilities the right to proceed in court on their own behalf and/or on
behalf of their child, unrepresented by counsel? 156 In answering this
question Justice Kennedy's analysis breaks down into three areas. In
part A, Justice Kennedy analyzes and takes particular note of certain
terms within the IDEA that "mandate or otherwise describe parental
involvement.' 57 Part B addresses the extent and limitations of
parental rights in special education law. 158 The final section, part C,
addresses the applicability and effects of the Spending Clause's
"clear notice" requirement. 159 The majority opinion concludes that
Congress clearly intended parents to enjoy rights under the IDEA and
so entitle them to prosecute IDEA claims on their own behalf. 60 The
153. Id. at 2005.
154. Id. at 1997.
155. Id. at 2007.
156. Id. at 1998.
157. Id. at 2000.
158. Id. at 2002.
159. Id. at 2006.
160. Id.
judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the case remanded
for further proceedings.161
1. Parental Involvement per the IDEA
Justice Kennedy initiates his discussion of parental involvement
as intended by Congress by returning to the fundamental goals of the
IDEA which include "ensur[ing] that all children with disabilities
have available to them a free appropriate public education" and
"ensur[ing] that the rights of children with disabilities and parents of
such children are protected., 162 According to Justice Kennedy, the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) includes
requirements which govern four areas pertinent to the Winkelman's
case:
[P]rocedures to be followed when developing a child's
IEP; criteria governing the sufficiency of an education
provided to a child; mechanisms for review that must
be made available when there are objections to the
IEP or to other aspects of IDEA proceedings; and the
requirement in certain circumstances that States
reimburse parents for various expenses.' 63
While there are other areas that might have been noted, Justice
Kennedy recognizes that these areas mandate or otherwise describe
parental involvement and are illustrative of the entire IDEA's
purpose for parents.!64
Justice Kennedy lists several of the procedures that must be
followed when developing a child's IEP to make sure parents play a
"significant role" in the process.' 65 Parents must be allowed to serve
as members of the team that develops the IEP. 166 Any concerns that
161. Id.
162. Id. at 2000. (citing 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400(d)(1)(A)-(B) (2000 ed., Supp.
2000 IV)).
163. Winkelman, 127 S. Ct. at 2000.
164. Id.
165. Id. (citing Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 53 (2005)).
166. Winkelman, 127 S. Ct. at 2000. (citing 20 U.S.C. §§ 1414 (d) (1) (B) &
§1414 (e)).
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parents might have regarding the education of their child are required
to be considered by the IEP team.' 67  If the parents have new
information regarding their child, then the IEP needs to be revised to
conform with the new information.' 68  Parents have the right to
examine all relevant records.' 69  Finally, states are required to
"establish and maintain procedures...to ensure that children with
disabilities and their parents are guaranteed procedural safeguards
with respect to the provision of a free appropriate public
education." 
70
According to Justice Kennedy there are certain criteria that
govern the sufficiency of an education provided to a child with a
disability. The education must be "free, appropriate and public."
171
An "appropriate" education is "specially designed...to meet the
unique needs of a child" coupled with any additional "related
services ... required to assist a child with a disability to benefit from
[that instruction]. 172  A "free" education, Justice Kennedy notes,
means just that: an education that is at no cost to the parents. 73 This
final criterion lends credence to the IDEA's fundamental principle of
considering parental involvement and rights.
Parental involvement does not end at the formation of the IEP
however; it also extends into the review process put in place so that
parents can object to IEPs or any other aspects of IDEA
proceedings. 174 Justice Kennedy vehemently notes that a parent is an
interested party and is therefore entitled to request review with
respect to any matter relating to the identification, evaluation, or
educational placement of the child, or the provision of a free
appropriate public education.' 75 To further strengthen the argument
that the IDEA intends parents to be involved, Justice Kennedy
considers the standards of Due Process hearings.' 76 He particularly
167. Winkelman, 127 S. Ct. at 2000. (citing § 1414 (d) (3)(A)(ii)).
168. Winkelman, 127 S. Ct. at 2000. (citing § 1414 (d)(4)(A)).
169. Winkelman, 127 S. Ct. at 2000. (citing § 1415 (b)(1)).
170. Winkelman, 127 S. Ct. at 2000. (citing § 1415 (a)).
171. Winkelman, 127 S. Ct. at 2000.
172. Id. at 2000-01. (citing §§ 1401(26)(A)), &(29)).
173. Winkelman, 127 S. Ct. at 2000-01.
174. Id. at 2001.
175. Id.
176. Id.
notes a subsection of § 1415 of the IDEA which states that in matters
where a procedural violation is alleged, the failure to provide FAPE
will be found if the violation to do so "significantly impeded the
parents' opportunity to participate in the decision-making process
regarding of the provision of a free appropriate public education to
the parents' child." '177
In conclusion of his section on the involvement of parents as
required by the IDEA, Justice Kennedy focuses on cost recovery
available to parents.17 8 Referencing to § 1412 of the IDEA, Justice
Kennedy points out that in certain circumstances the court or hearing
officers are allowed to require state agencies "to reimburse the
parents... for the cost of [private school] enrollment if the court or
hearing officer finds that the agency had not made a free appropriate
public education available to the child.- 179 Second, he notes that the
IDEA provides rules to govern when and to what extent a court may
award attorney's fees and an award "to a prevailing party who is the
parent of a child with disability."' 8 0
Justice Kennedy agrees that the above provisions allot parents
independent, enforceable rights under the IDEA.18 1 These rights can
be enjoyed by parents at the administrative stage, and Justice
Kennedy finds it "inconsistent with the statutory scheme" if parents
were disallowed from continuing to affirm these rights in federal
court. 182
2. Parental Rights: Extent and Limitations
Justice Kennedy builds a foundation for his argument that parents
do have the right to assert claims in federal court by first laying out
the many provisions that allow parents to bring a complaint at the
177. Id. (citing 20 U.S.C. §1415 (f)(3)(E)(i)-(ii)). Justice Kennedy also
references to 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (g)(1) which states that "any party aggrieved by the
findings and decision rendered in [a due process] hearing may appeal such findings
and decision to the State educational agency." Winkelman, 127 S. Ct. at 2001.
178. Id. at 2001.
179. Id. at 2001. (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii)).
180. Id. at 2001-02. (citing 20 U.S.C. §§ 1415(i)(3)(B)), & (i)(3)(B)(i)(I)).
181. Id. at 2002.
182. Id.
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administrative level.1 83 Believing it would be absurd that the IDEA
would give rights to parents that would be barred as soon as they
attempted to claim them in federal court, Justice Kennedy lists the
many provisions giving parents the right to bring administrative
complaints. 84 Among these he mentions the requirement that the
State Educational Agency develop and provide a model form to help
parents in filing a complaint,8 5 the section of the IDEA which
addresses the manner and time requirements of an agency's response
to a parent's due process complaint,186 and section 1415(i)(3) which
refers entirely to the parent's complaint. 1
87
Having laid this foundation, the Court reasons that the Act does
not "sub silentio" or "by implication" prevent the parents of a child
with a disability from vindicating their rights via the filing of a civil
action. 188 In fact, the opposite result is the case when taking into
consideration the expansive provisions of the IDEA and the extensive
parental involvement they call for.189 In response to the school
district's argument that the IDEA merely gives parents "collateral
tools" with regard to the rights of their child and not independent
rights, the Court returns once again to the grammatical structure of
one of the IDEA's main stated purposes: "to ensure that the rights of
children with disabilities and parents of such children are
protected."' 90 Justice Kennedy writes that it would "make no sense"
if the word "rights" referred only to the rights of the children; it
clearly also includes the rights of parents.'
91
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (b)(8).
186. § 1415 (c)(2).
187. Winkelman, 127 S. Ct. at 2002. (citing 20 U.S.C. §1415 (i)(3)(B)(i)).
Other sections that Justice Kennedy mentions include 20 U.S.C. §§ 1415 (b)(6)(A);
(f)(3)(C); (e)(2)(A)(ii); & (i)(2)(A).
188. Winkelman, 127 S. Ct. at 2002.
189. Id.
190. Id. (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(B)).
191. Id. at 2002. Further provisions are listed to support this view, including §
1415(a) which requires educational agencies establish procedures that would to
"ensure that children with disabilities and their parents are guaranteed procedural
safeguards with respect to the provision of a free appropriate public education." Id.
(citing 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (a)).
In defense of its argument, the respondent school district turns to
case law by citing to Doe v. Board of Education.19 2 Doe would have
the Court read all references to parent's rights as inherently referring
to the child's rights.' 93 Passionately, Justice Kennedy opines that,
[E]ven if [the Court] were inclined to ignore the plain
text of the statute (the IDEA) in considering this
theory, [the Court] disagree[s] that the sole purpose
driving IDEA's involvement of parents is to facilitate
vindication of a child's rights. It is not a novel
proposition to say that parents have a recognized legal
interest in the education and upbringing of their
child. 19 4
Not wanting to only address the respondent's argument for vfhy a
parent does not have his/her own rights, the Court also explains and
rejects a variation on respondent's argument that some courts appeals
have adopted. 195 The variation considered asserts that a parent does
have rights, but only as they pertain to certain aspects of the hearing
officer's findings and decision;. however, the rights are limited and
not all IDEA-based challenges are available to the parent. 196 The
reasoning behind this argument is that a "party aggrieved" is entitled
to receive a remedy, and under the IDEA, parents are only entitled to
certain procedural remedies and reimbursements, therefore a parent
can only be a "party aggrieved" in matters that would call for such
remedies, no other matters.'1 97
192. Id. at 2003.
193. Id. See also, Doe v. Bd. of Educ. of Baltimore City, 165 F.3d 260, 263
(4th Cir. 1998).
194. Winkelman, 127 S. Ct. at 2003. See e.g., Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510, 534-35; 45 S. Ct. 571, 69 L.Ed. 1070 (1925) (acknowledging "the liberty
of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under
their control"); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399-401 (1923).
195. Winkelman, 127 S. Ct. at 2003.
196. Id. An example of the limited rights a parent would have under this view
is found in Collinsgru, where a parent would have a cause of action for several
procedural violations and reimbursement requests, but not substantive for all IDEA
challenges. Winkelman, 127 S. Ct. at 2003. See also, Collinsgru, 161 F.3d, at 233;
20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii).
197. Winkelman, 127 S. Ct. at 2003.
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Justice Kennedy refutes this argument on two grounds. First, he
notes that while there are provisions that provide for procedural
remedies and reimbursements, there are other provisions that give
other entitlements, so it is unclear whether the limitation to certain
remedies was intended.198 Second, there is little support to suppose
that when a child is mentioned in the IDEA, parents are excluded by
implication, or vice versa. 199 With this uncertainty, Justice Kennedy
turns to the statutory structure once again, raising several examples
of the importance of parental involvement and the rights parents
have.2° ° Considering the statutory structure, the Court concludes that
the IDEA "creates in parents an independent stake not only in the
procedures and costs implicated by this process but also in the
substantive decisions to be made., 20 1 Therefore a parent may be
considered a "party aggrieved" with regards to any matter
implicating their rights.202
Recognizing that this alternative argument that parents' rights are
limited to certain nonsubstantive matters might convince some of his
colleagues, 20 3 Justice Kennedy delves into the "incongruous results"
that would follow if the proposition were to be accepted.204 He notes
the difficulty that would arise in disentangling procedural and
reimbursement rights from substantive rights since they are
interwoven in the IDEA's provisions. 20 5 Also, the IDEA gives no
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 2004. Justice Kennedy recalls the importance of parental
participation in the implementation and substantive formulation of the IDEA's
procedures and their child's education. Id. The statute, the Justice notes, gives
parents to the right to request a hearing on "any matter relating to the identification,
evaluation, or educational placement of the child, or the provision of a free
appropriate public education to such child." Id. (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6)(A)).
And if dissatisfied with the hearing officer's decision the Act also gives parents the
right to appeal to a state level officer and then "any party aggrieved" may bring "a
civil action." Id. (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A)).
201. Winkelman, 127 S. Ct. at 2004.
202. Id.
203. In fact it did because this is the heart of the Justice Scalia's reason for
concurring in part and dissenting in part and for Justice Thomas joining. See
section (B) below.
204. Winkelman, 127 S. Ct. at 2004.
205. Id. at 2005.
direction as to how a court or a parent might be able to differentiate
between these matters in practice.20 6 Under this approach a parent
who wishes to challenge the school district's offer of free and
appropriate public education would only be able to do so under two
circumstances: "when the parent happens to have some claim related
to the procedures employed; and when he or she is able to incur, and
has in fact incurred, expenses creating a right to reimbursement., 20 7
Without either of these two circumstances at issue then a parent
would not be able to challenge the adequacy of the child's education
because it would not be considered "relevant" to the causes of action
a parent would be allowed to raise.20 8 Justice Kennedy concludes by
writing of the great injustice that would arise from such an approach
since it would disallow many parents from participating in the
exercise of their rights, and would flatly contradict the IDEA's main
purpose of ensuring that the rights of children and their parents are
protected.20 9
3. The Spending Clause Is Not Applicable
To conclude his opinion, Justice Kennedy confronts
Respondent's contention that even with all of the reasoning applied
by the Court the Winkelmans cannot prevail without satisfying the
requirements of the Spending Clause.210 Since the IDEA was passed
pursuant to the Spending Clause it must fulfill the requirement of
providing "clear notice" to the states of any new conditions,
obligations, or liabilities placed on them.211  Respondent argues
thereby, that since the IDEA is imprecise as to the independent rights
it confers on parents it does not provide "clear notice" and therefore
cannot encumber the states with a new burden.212 In support of their
argument, the school district relies on the Arlington case in which it
was held that the since the IDEA did not "furnish clear notice
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id. See also 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(B).
210. Winkelman, 127 S. Ct. at 2005-06.
211. Id. at 2006.
212. Id.
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regarding the liability at issue" for expert's fees, the school districts
were not liable for such.2 13
Justice Kennedy responds by distinguishing between the issue in
Arlington and the issue in the present case. In Arlington the issue
was whether the IDEA gave clear notice as to the liability being
claimed by the parents, whereas in the Winkelman case there is no
new question of liability.214 The determination that parents have
independent, enforceable rights "does not impose any substantive
condition or obligation on States they would not otherwise be
required by law to observe." 215 The monetary recovery will be the
same and not increased by recognizing that some rights reside not
just in the child but in both the parent and the child.216 Justice
Kennedy concedes that were there independent, enforceable rights
being attributed to a distinct class of people then the Arlington
analysis would apply, but such is not the situation in the present
case.
217
In closing his opinion, Justice Kennedy concludes that the
Congressional intent in granting parents rights in the IDEA was
harmonious with the purpose of the IDEA and aligned with "our
social and legal traditions." 218 The relationship that exists between a
parent and child, he fervently writes, makes it clear that a parent does
have a legal interest in the education of their child.219 Congress also
identified this legal and social interest when it found that "the
education of children with disabilities can be made more effective
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id. Respondent further argued that a ruling in favor of the Winkelmans
would in fact increase costs to the States in that they would be forced to defend
complaints and suits against parents who are not trained in law and ethics. Id.
Justice Kennedy responds that such a concern is not sufficient to create Spending
Clause concerns. Id. Finally, there is already a built-in protection in the IDEA for
such cases. Id. Courts hold the power "to award attorney's fees to a prevailing
educational agency whenever a parent has presented a 'complaint or subsequent
case of action.. .for any improper purpose, such as to harass, to cause unnecessary
delay, or to needlessly increase the cost of litigation."' Id. (citing 20 U.S.C. §
1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(III)).
218. Winkelman, 127 S. Ct. at 2006.
219. Id.
by ... strengthening the role and responsibility of parents and ensuring
that families of such children have meaningful opportunities to
participate in the education of their children at school and at
home."22 Because of this, the judgment of the Court of Appeals was
reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings.
B. Justice Scalia's Concurrence in Part and Dissent in Part
Justice Scalia, with whom Justice Thomas joins, concurs with the
majority that parents have the right to proceed pro se in court under
the IDEA in certain circumstances such as when they ask for
reimbursement for private school expenses or seek to rectify
violations of their personal procedural rights. 221  However, Justice
Scalia does not agree that parents should be able to proceed pro se
when they seek a "judicial determination that their child's free
appropriate public education (or FAPE) is substantively
inadequate."222
1. The IDEA Endows Parents with Certain Rights
Justice Scalia concedes that parents certainly do have rights to
plead and bring their own civil actions, under federal law,
specifically under the IDEA, when they are the "party aggrieved. '223
A "party aggrieved" is "[a] party entitled to a remedy; espy., a party
whose personal, pecuniary, or property rights have been adversely
affected by another person's actions or by a court's decree or
judgment., 224 So, for Justice Scalia, the focus turns to identifying
what the rights of parents are as awarded by the IDEA, because it is
220. Id. at 2006-07 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(5)).
221. Winkelman, 127 S. Ct. at 2007.
222. Id.
223. Id. Justice Scalia points to statutory law that says "in all courts of the
United States the parties may plead and conduct their own cases personally or by
counsel." 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (emphasis added). He also points to the IDEA's terms
under § 1415(i)(2)(A) which provide that, "any party aggrieved by the findings and
decision [of a hearing officer] shall have the right to bring a civil action with
respect to the [administrative] complaint." Id. (emphasis added).
224. Winkelman, 127 S. Ct. at 2007 (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1154
(8th ed. 2004)).
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only for these rights that a parent can be a party aggrieved, and
consequently, file their own case in federal court.225 He identifies
parents' rights as limited to two areas: the right of reimbursement for
private school expenditures 226 and the right to various procedural
protections. 227 Any rights falling outside of these two areas are not
and should not be accorded to the parents for they belong to the child
alone.228
2. The Flawed Reasoning of the Majority
Justice Scalia writes that the majority's decision to go further and
grant parents even more rights is troubling.229 Justice Scalia admits
that parents have an interest in their child's education, but "there is a
difference between an interest and a statutory right.,231 In fact, he
writes, "[t]he text of the IDEA makes clear that parents have no right
to the education itself. '23  The "statutory right" to a free appropriate
public education is inherent in the child, and as evidence of this the
Justice lists various sections of the IDEA, noting that the Court is
unable to provide even one section or provision giving parents this
225. Winkelman, 127 S. Ct. at 2007.
226. Justice Scalia cites to 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) (2000 ed., Supp.
IV) noting that "'a court or hearing officer may require the [school district] to
reimburse the parents' for private school expenditures 'if the court or hearing
officer finds that the [school district] had not made a free appropriate public
education available to the child." Winkelman, 127 S. Ct. at 2007-08.
227. A parent has a right to certain procedural protections during the
development of the IEP (individualized educational program) of their child and
during subsequent administrative challenges. Winkelman, 127 S. Ct. at 2008.
During the IEP, for example parents must be considered "a member of their child's
IEP team" and they must be given the "opportunity to examine records and
participate in IEP meetings. Id. (citing to 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1) and §§
1415(b)(6), (8)). After the IEP, and consequent to any complaints the parent may
also file an administrative complaint through which the parent may receive
protection of their rights for a number of procedural infractions. Winkelman, 127
S. Ct. at 2008.
228. See Winkelman, 127 S. Ct. at 2008.
229. The Court (majority) held that parents are free to appear pro se in court
for procedural violations, to seek reimbursement and when they wish to challenge
the "substantive adequacy of their child's FAPE." Winkelman, 127 S. Ct. at 2008.
230. Winkelman, 127 S. Ct. at 2008
231. Id.
right.232 "The Court's spraying statutory sections about like buckshot
cannot create a substantive parental right to education where none
exists. ' '2 33 To allow parents to act without a lawyer in all IDEA cases
"sweeps far more broadly than the text allows. 234 In the majority
opinion the Court admits that the IDEA does not grant parents with
reimbursement and procedural protection rights because they have a
right to the education itself.235 Justice Scalia posits that the logical
step to be taken after such a concession is that the rights that are
given to parents are not by accident, neither are those that are not
given to the parents.236 To conclude otherwise, as the majority has
done, is erroneous. 237  A clear distinction has been made in the
IDEA, according to Justice Scalia, between the rights given to
parents and those given to children.
In furtherance of his position, Justice Scalia distinguishes the
Court's claim that the "IDEA does not differentiate...between the
rights accorded to children and the rights accorded to parents" as
232. As examples of FAPE belonging to the child, Justice Scalia cites to §§
1400(d)(1)(A); 1408 (a)(2)(C)(i); 1411(e)(3)(F)(i); 1414(a)(1)(D)(i)(II) and
1415(b)(6)(A). Winkelman, 127 S. Ct. at 2008. Justice Scalia goes on to say that it
is understandable that the IDEA fails to mention the parent's right to FAPE and
that is because it is "obviously" inherent in the child because the child is the one
who receives the education. Id.
233. Winkelman, 127 S. Ct. at 2009.
234. Id. at 2008.
235. Id. at 2009.
236. Id.
237. Id. The majority relies on the many procedural guarantees that parents
are given during the administrative process to conclude that parents have
"substantive rights" to FAPE. Id. Justice Scalia insists that the granting of
procedural rights is "not the same as giving [the parents] the right to that
education." Id. He also argues that the Court cannot reasonably rely on any rights
granted to the parents to be used explicitly at the administrative level because they
are just that: administrative level rights. Id. They should extend no further than the
administrative level. Id. He writes,
[p]arents thus have the power, at the administrative stage, to
litigate all of the various rights under the statute since at that stage
they are acting not only on their own behalf, but on behalf of their
child as well. This tells us nothing whatever about whose rights
they are.
Id.
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being clearly wrong. 238 The IDEA does give parents separate rights
including claiming a reimbursement on private school tuition and
excusing an IEP member from attending the IEP meeting. These are
rights which are obviously only applicable by and created for parents;
a child would not be able to exercise such rights.2 39 To the Court's
argument that even those rights previously mentioned require a
parent to prove the substantive inadequacy of a FAPE, consequently
granting the parent substantive rights to their child's education,
Justice Scalia responds by calling the Court's logic "a total non
sequitur., 240  Congress may have required parents to prove the
inadequacy of their child's FAPE, but that right sheds no light upon
whether the right to education is possessed by parents.24' Per
Congress the right belongs to the "party aggrieved" and Justice Scalia
stresses that it is the Court's duty to apply the term and "not to run
from it." 242
3. Applying This Distinction Is Not As Difficult As The
Majority Claims
Justice Scalia then turns to the administrative reasoning that the
Court provided for their decision. First he addresses whether, as the
Court claims, applying the distinction between parental and child
rights will truly be too complicated for the courts to apply.243 Justice
Scalia points out that a majority of Federal Courts of Appeals already
administer this distinction by allowing parents to file pro se as to
238. Id. at 2009-10. Justice Scalia cites to Emery v. Roanoke City Sch. Bd.
quoting "[P]arents and children are distinct legal entities under the IDEA."
Winkelman, 127 S. Ct. at 2010. (citing to 432 F.3d 294,299 (Cal. 2005)). He also
cites to petitioner's amici as agreeing with him in saying "Congress specifically
indicated that parents have rights under the Act that are separate from and
independent of their children's rights." Winkelman, 127 S. Ct. at 2010. (citing to
Brief for Senator Edward M. Kennedy et al, as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners
at 18, Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 127 S. Ct. 1994 (2007)).
239. Winkelman, 127 S. Ct. at 2010.
240. Id.
241. Id. Even if, as the Court claims, the right to FAPE is the "most
fundamental [right] to the Act" that still does not justify giving that right to the
parent and allowing him/her to file suit. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id.
some claims, but not as to a claim of denial of FAPE.2 4 4 In contrast,
the Court provides no evidence of this confusion in actual practice,
and rightly so because as Justice Scalia reiterates, the IDEA's
distinctions are clear and easy to understand, so the Court would be
hard pressed to find examples to support their claim.245
Second, Justice Scalia turns to the Court's argument that to make
such a distinction would be an injustice as it would leave many
parents seeking to file suit for substantive issues without remedy.2
4 6
Justice Scalia suggests their remedy would be the same remedy that
all parents have in such a case: to hire an attorney and bring suit.
247
Cases that involve substantive issues are by nature more complicated
than reimbursement requests or procedural violations,248 without the
aid of an attorney, courts will be burdened by the influx of pro se
cases. Since parents will be filing without the assistance of an
attorney, many of these will be unmeritorious cases simply
encumbering the already burdened court system.249  Accordingly,
Justice Scalia repeats his decision that the Winkelmans should be
allowed to proceed with respect to their first two claims of
reimbursement and procedural violations, but not with regard to the
third: the request of a declaration that their child's FAPE was
substantively inadequate.250
244. Id. Justice Scalia cites to many appellate cases where this distinction has
been applied. See Mosely v. Bd. of Educ., 434 F.3d 527, 532 (7th Cir. 2006);
Collingsru, 161 F.3d at 233; Wenger v. Canastota Cent. Sch. Dist., 146 F.3d 123,
126 (2d Cir. 1998) (per curiam); Devine v. Indian River City Sch. Bd., 121 F.3d
576, 581, fn. 17 (11th Cir. 11 1997).
245. Winkelman, 127 S. Ct. at 2010.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. According to Justice Scalia, a request for reimbursement by nature is less
likely to be sought after frivolously since most parents will only pay for private
school tuition if they believe they have a strong case for proving that FAPE was
inadequate. Winkelman, 127 S. Ct. at 2011. Similarly, an action that is brought
forth to rectify a procedural violation is less complex in nature and, if frivolous, can
be disposed of by a court quite rapidly. Id.
249. Id. at 2011.
250. Id.
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V. IMPACT
With recent decisions like Schaffer shifting the burden of proof to
parents and Arlington taking away from parents the possibility of
reimbursement of expert's fees even when they win, parents of
children with disabilities remained attentive to the Court's decision in
Winkelman, hoping the Court would finally acknowledge their
rights.2 51 On May 21, 2007 such acknowledgement occurred at last.
The decision to allow parents to proceed pro se will naturally bring
with it both benefits and potential drawbacks; however, with the
benefits being far weightier and the drawbacks avoidable, the
Winkelman decision has proven to be a success for parents. 252
A. Low Income Parents Have a Venue for Asserting their
Children's Rights
Parents are possibly the fittest agents "to ferret out inadequate
education. "253 They are aware of their child's progress or lack
thereof, whether or not the proposed IEP is being followed, and
inherently are protective of their child. So long as they take an
interest in their child's disability and education, parents can become
some of the most passionate advocates on behalf of their children.2 54
With the Winkelman decision the Court has finally given them the
opportunity to do so.
251. See discussion supra, Part II, Historical Background (exploring history of
Schaffer and Arlington).
252. During oral arguments in the Winkelman case, parent's counsel was
noted as saying "It is our position that those public policy concerns about pro se
litigants burdening the court, burdening opposing counsel, are dramatically
outweighed by the fact that -- by the reality that two-thirds of the disabled children
in the United States come from families that cannot afford counsel. Oral arguments
before Supreme Court Feb 2007.
253. Ferve Ozturk & Jaime Rogers, "Bulletin: Winkelman v. Parma City
School District oral argument preview", available at
http://www.law.comell.edu/supct/cert/05-983.html
254. In working at the Pepperdine Special Education Advocacy Clinic, I have
worked with many parents who become very knowledgeable of their child's needs
and very effective at advocating for their children at IEP meetings and elsewhere.
Additionally the IDEA included in it's findings that "the education of children with
disabilities can be made more effective by... strengthening the role and
responsibility of parents..." 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(5)(B).
Due to the complexity and specialization needed for handling an
IDEA case, there is a severe lack of lawyers who are willing to take
them on without a considerable retainer.255 For those parents who
can afford to, the safest option is likely still to be to hire a special
education attorney. The Council of Parent Attorneys and Advocates
("COPAA") conducted an informal survey of their membership to
determine the average hourly rate, retainer and total cost for handling
an IDEA case.2 56 The results indicated the hourly rate can range
from $150 to $450 an hour depending on the attorney's experience.
The majority of attorneys surveyed require a retainer fee of $3000,
but some ask for up to $10,000. The survey also revealed that the
total cost for practitioners may range from $10,000 to more than
$100,000. Many parents are rendered unable to obtain qualified
counsel as these high fees are insurmountable.
"[S]pecial education disabilities have long been linked to poverty
and minority status. 257  Currently there are approximately seven
million school-aged children with disabilities who qualify to receive
services under the IDEA.258 A large percentage of these children
come from families who are considered "low-income." In 2000, the
Department of Education conducted a study in which they discovered
that thirty-six percent (or over two million) of children with
disabilities come from families earning less than $25,000 annually,
and approximately twenty-four percent live in poverty.259 Over two
255. The Third Circuit recognized this dilemma in Collinsgru v. Palmyra
Board of Education, stating, "[w]e acknowledge this to be true, for most attorneys
will be reluctant to take on cases like this, characterized as they are by voluminous
administrative records, long administrative hearings, and specialized legal issues,
without a significant retainer." 161 F.3d 225, 236 (3d Cir. 1998).
256. COPAA is a non-profit organization that provides information, training
and resources for parents, advocates, and attorneys to ensure that every child
receives FAPE as guaranteed by the IDEA. (citing to Brief for Council of Parent
Attorneys and Advocates, Inc. et al,. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 9,
fn. 4, Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 127 S. Ct. 1994 (2007)).
257. Brief for Council of Parent Attorneys and Advocates, Inc. et al, as Amici
Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 10, Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 127 S.
Ct. 1994 (2007).
258. Id. (citing to Schaffer, 546 U.S. at 49).
259. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 257, at 10-11. (citing MARY WAGNER,
THE CHILDREN WE SERVE: DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF ELEMENTARY AND
MIDDLE SCHOOL STUDENTS WITH DISABILITIES AND THEIR HOUSEHOLDS, 28-29,
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thirds of children with disabilities (or approximately 4.5 million)
come from families earning less than $50,000 annually.260
Before Winkelman, many of these families would likely have
turned to legal aid assistance and been turned away. One reason they
might be turned away is for not meeting the annual income
requirement.261 Yet, while their income might not have been low
enough to be able to receive the free legal assistance, they probably
would not be able to afford a private attorney.262 The Winkelmans
are an example of such a family caught in this dilemma: their annual
income is above the requirement to receive free legal assistance, but
much too low to hire a private attorney. With an annual income of
$40,000, no savings, and a monthly mortgage payment of $1,300, the
Winkelmans could not afford to agree to exorbitant fees like the one
asked for by one lawyer: a fee of $2,600 to be paid biweekly.2 63
Ex. 3-10 (2002), http://www.seels.net/designdocs/SEELS_ Children_ WeServe_
Report.pdf.)
260. Two years later a follow-up survey was performed known as "Wave 2"
which revealed that the situation did not improve. Brief for Petitioners, supra note
257, at 11. (citing JOSE BLACKORBY, ET AL., WAVE I WAVE 2 OVERVIEW, 2-6
(2004),
http://www.seels.net/designdocs/wl w2/SEELS_W 1 W2completejreport.pdf).
Although there were four percent less children with disabilities in families making
under $50,000 per year, the changes, according to the surveyors, "[were] not
sufficient to cause a meaningful decline in the percentage of students with
disabilities who live in poverty; 21% are living in poverty in Wave 2, a
significantly higher rate than among children in the general population (16% US
Department of Commerce, 2002)." Id. at 2-5. Furthermore the more recent survey
revealed that approximately 8% of the families who were earning between $25,000
to $50,000 per year in the first survey dropped down to poverty level in Wave 2.
Id. at 2-6.
261. A family of four who lives in the lower forty-eight states can receive
legal aid if their annual income is less than or equal to $20,750. Brief for
Petitioners, supra note 257, at 12, fn. 5.
262. "Families above the poverty line living on less than $50,000 per
year.. .who do not qualify for subsidized legal assistance, 'seldom are able to afford
help from the private bar."' Brief for Petitioners, supra note 257, at 12 (citing
ALBERT H. CANTRIL, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, AGENDA FOR ACCESS: THE
AMERICAN PEOPLE AND CIVIL JUSTICE, (1996),
http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/downloads/sclaid/agendaforaccess.pdf).
263. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 257, at 9, fn. 3. (citing Adam Liptak,
Nonlawyer Father Wins His Suit over Education, and the Bar Is Upset, N.Y.
TIMES, May 6, 2006, at A8).
If a family were to meet or fall under the maximum annual
income mark required to receive free legal assistance, they might still
be turned away if there were not enough resources at the legal clinic
to handle their cases. Approximately four of every five families who
meet the income requirements to receive free representation by legal
clinics are nevertheless turned away due to insufficient resources.2 64
Prior to Winkelman, parents would have been limited or simply
prevented from accessing the federal courts; if their complaint was
not settled or did not reach a favorable decision in administrative
court the parent was out of luck. Today, parents who would
otherwise have no other option are allowed to legally proceed as far
as is necessary to defend the rights of their children.
B. The Avoidable Drawbacks
The respondent School District argued, as did the dissenting
Justice Scalia, that allowing parents to proceed in court pro se would
only be detrimental to their children and depletive of funds for the
school districts. Respondent argued that parents were not trained and
to allow them to proceed pro se into federal court would not only
impose high costs on school districts but also deprive their children
of less than competent representation.265 Justice Scalia also argued
that allowing parents to proceed pro se would impose burdens on the
courts as the amount of unmeritorious claims would see a sharp
rise.266
According to the Respondent School District giving parents the
reigns of their child's legal recourses will only make them less likely
to enter into alternative dispute resolution and instead head straight
towards the courts.2 67 Public school systems have limited budgets
264. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 257, at 12.
265. Brief for The Council of the Great City Schools, as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Respondent 6, Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 127 S. Ct. 1994
(2007).
266. Winkelman, 127 S. Ct. at2011.
267. Brief for Respondent, supra note 265, at 5. Respondent argues, "The
legislative history of the recent amendments is replete with language encouraging
mediation of IDEA disputes in order to avoid litigation and its attendant costs." Id.
The detailed and broad reach of the administrative process as laid out by the IDEA
shows this focus on "early resolution... intended to establish a cooperative
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and by permitting parents to proceed pro se more and more of the
school's money will be spent on litigation costs than on education.268
Justice Scalia's dissent addressed similar concerns. 269 The school
argued that a "prohibition on pro se representation" may have served
the child more than costly litigation by encouraging informal
resolution between parents and schools, giving them the opportunity
to settle matters in "positive and constructive ways., 27" Whereas
lawyers are bound professionally and ethically not to bring cases that
are frivolous or without merit, parents do not have such restraints and
are likely to be emotionally engaged in the case bringing far more
cases that are without merit before the courts.2 71
Advocates for parents strongly disagree that courts will be struck
with an increase in frivolous suits. Parents are still going to have to
be concerned with attorney's fees awards going to the school district
if they proceed with a case without merit.272 Also many parents will
relationship among all the members of a child's IEP team, including the parents."
Id. (citing to 20 U.S.C. §1415).
268. Brief for Respondent, supra note 265, at 10.
269. See supra Sec. IV (B).
270. Brief for Respondent, supra note 265, at 5.
271. Mark Walsh, Experts Ponder Whether Parents Will Rush To Court,
EDUCATION WEEK (2007).
272. The pertinent section of the IDEA addressing Attorney's Fees reads:
"(i) In general. In any action or proceeding brought under
this section, the court, in its discretion, may award reasonable
attorney's fees as part of the costs--(I) to a prevailing party who
is the parent of a child with a disability; (II) to a prevailing party
who is a State educational agency or local educational agency
against the attorney of a parent who files a complaint or
subsequent cause of action that is frivolous, unreasonable, or
without foundation, or against the attorney of a parent who
continued to litigate after the litigation clearly became frivolous,
unreasonable, or without foundation; or (I) to a prevailing State
educational agency or local educational agency against the
attorney of a parent, or against the parent, if the parent's
complaint or subsequent cause of action was presented for any
improper purpose, such as to harass, to cause unnecessary delay,
or to needlessly increase the cost of litigation." 20 U.S.C. §
1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(I)-(III) (emphasis added).
simply not proceed on their own without a lawyer because they are
afraid to "do it alone. 273
Another potential drawback of the Winkelman case is that since
the federal phase of an IDEA case is so different from the
administrative stage, untrained parents are likely to make matters
worse for the children they are representing. For example, children's
rights may be waived unintentionally by the parents. 274  This
consequence is avoidable, however, since the special education
community is tight-knit and there are many resources available for
parents who do choose to progress legally past the administrative
level.275
These potential dangers will require both parents and school
districts to take more responsibility upon their actions. School
districts desiring to save financial resources for educational purposes
and not legal ones will have to be more mindful and careful in
following IDEA procedures. They will have to give serious
consideration to parental concerns and complaints. If failing to
273. Jay Kravetz,, School Attorneys: Publicity of Winkelman may Generate
more Parent-led Litigation, LRP PUBLICATIONS (2007). Kravetz interviewed
parent's Attorney Deborah A. Mattison, with Wiggins, Childs, Quinn & Pantazis in
Birmingham, Alabama who opined that she doesn't expect an increase in lawsuits
because most parents will be unwilling to "do it alone." She says, "This case does
give parents more rights-and I think they will take advantage of their additional
rights to help their child receive FAPE-but I don't think most parents will want to
have their case in court without the help of a lawyer." Id.
274. Brief for Respondent, supra note 265, at 22.
275. The internet is abundant with sources for the parent seeking to proceed to
federal court. Websites like www.wrightslaw.com provide free articles and
opinions that can inform parents as to their rights and how to go about advocating
for them. Additional sites online can be accessed by a cursory command on a
search engine. Also, for example the state of California has 21 regional centers
where parents can learn and find more information regarding their rights. The
Council of Parent Attorneys and Advocates also has a myriad of resources and
information and provides an annual conference to train parents on how to advocate
for their children's rights. Parents can also choose to visit local law school libraries
and seek the assistance of legal reference librarians to learn more about special
education law. More and more law schools are focusing on special education law
allowing their students to gain experience by implementing Special Education
Clinics and parents may be able to find assistance from students and professors
through these schools. Among these are Pepperdine Law School, Whittier Law
School, Stanford Law School, Harvard Law School, New York Law School, and
University of Minnesota Law School, to name a few.
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include a parent in the IEP decisions might mean legal action (which
it does) then school districts will have to be even more cautious and
considerate in their inclusion of parents at all stages. This is great
news for parents who often feel left out of the process and
consequently dissatisfied. But Winkelman also places more
responsibility on parents to be thoughtful before filing a complaint, to
consider alternative dispute resolution, and to engage even more in
their child's education.
While there are several pitfalls for the parent who chooses to
proceed in federal court pro se the benefits of being allowed to do so
are much weightier. Parents are in a far better position now that lack
of finances and the scarcity of legal aid are no longer obstacles to
their children's rights. What this case really does is tip the balance in
the parent's favor; the Court is acknowledging the important role of
the parent in a child's education.2 76
C. Impact on Special Education Law
Only twelve special education cases have ever been decided by
the U.S. Supreme Court, with the most recent two cases in the year
2007. Prior to these cases were Schaffer and Arlington, decided in
2005 and 2006 respectively. Both were cases that clearly made a
parent's fight in court an upward struggle by imposing on them the
burden of proof and striking the expert's fees award opportunity.
Winkelman brought with it a breath of fresh air to parents and their
advocates, and after its 7-2 decision left begging the question
whether this relief was temporary or a reflection of what was to
come. The answer came unexpectedly sooner than anticipated with
the case Board of Education v. Tom F., the most recent special
education case to be heard by the Supreme Court, decided on October
10, 2007.277
276. Kravetz, supra note 273. Kravetz also interviewed parent's Attorney,
William Hurd, with Troutman Sanders in Richmond, Va, who opined that
Winkelman "may not increase the number of lawsuits by a large number that
parents represent themselves in, [but] it will give them additional avenues for
advocating for their children." Id.
277. Bd. of Educ. of the City Sch. Dist. of the City of New York v. Tom F.,
128 S.Ct. 1 (2007).
The issue presented in Tom F. was whether the parent of a child
with disabilities can sue for a reimbursement of private school tuition
despite the fact that his child was never enrolled in a public school.278
The parent in the case, Tom F., enrolled his son Gilbert in
kindergarten at Stephen Gaynor School, a private school, specializing
in the education of children with disabilities. 7 9 Although having
already paid for two years of his private schooling, Petitioner school
district sent Tom F. a letter recommending changing Gilbert's
placement to a public school.28 ° Parent Tom F. disagreed with the
placement, kept Gilbert at the private Gaynor School, and filed a
complaint seeking reimbursement for the current school year. 28'
Losing at the administrative level, the school district appealed to the
federal district court who held in their favor.2 82  On appeal, the
Appellate court for the Second Circuit held in favor of Tom F. in
light of recent precedent. 83 On writ, the Supreme Court released a
split decision, 4-4, meaning the ruling of the Appellate court was
affirmed and Tom F. would be receiving the private school tuition
reimbursement.284 While the case only has authority with respect to
those parents and school districts within the Second Circuit, it
nevertheless has inspired many parents and upset school districts
across the nation.
Whether Winkelman and Tom F. signify the Supreme Court's
permanent turn in favor of parents is unclear. The pendulum has
swung in both directions over the history of special education case
278. Brief for The United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at
8, Bd. Of Educ. of the City Sch. Dist. of the City of New York v. Tom F., No. 06-
637(2007).
279. Brief for Respondent, supra note 265, at 3.
280. Id. at 4.
281. Id.
282. Id. at 5.
283. Id.. The recent precedent was Frank G. v. Board of Educ., 459 F. 3d 356
(2d Cir. 2006) in which the Second Circuit decided in favor of the parent in finding
that nowhere in the IDEA is there a requirement that a child with a disability first
receive public school special education before being eligible for reimbursement of
private school tuition. Brief for Respondent, supra note 265, at 5.
284. Tom F, 128 S.Ct, 1 at 1.
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law.285 However, it is certain that currently parents are reaping the
long awaited recognition of their rights as granted by the IDEA.
Parental judgment is being awarded more consideration, as parents
are now able to pursue federal court proceedings on their own behalf
without representation when they feel it is necessary, and at least in
the 2 nd Circuit are able to use their own judgment in deciding their
child's placement.
VI. CONCLUSION
With Winkelman, parents are not only seeing their rights
acknowledged but are also beginning to see the scales being tipped in
their favor for the first time in many years. Despite recent case law
being decided in favor of school districts, the Winkelman Court has
held that the IDEA gives parents independent, enforceable rights
thereby entitling them to prosecute IDEA claims on their own
behalf.28 6 The impact of this decision is for the most part only
speculative as only time will tell if parents and school districts are
able to settle cases out of court or if litigation increases, but it
certainly favors parents. Parents can now protect their children's
rights beyond the administrative court level regardless of their
economic standing. As a result both parents and school districts will
have to be more responsible in the manner in which the early stages
of interaction are handled to prevent a flooding of courts with
parental complaints.
285. Pete Wright is credited with using "the swinging pendulum" in reference
to the Supreme Court's swaying from limiting parental rights to promoting parental
rights. http://www.wrightslaw.com/law/art/winkleman.pwanalysis.htm
286. Winkelman, 127 S. Ct. at 2005.
